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"MAY I OFFER YOU SOMETHING TO DRINK
FROM THE BEVERAGE CART?": A CLOSE
LOOK AT THE POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR
AIRLINES SERVING ALCOHOL
CATHERINE STONE BOWE
A IRLINES INSTITUTED in-flight service of alcohol in
the early fifties to promote an elegant means of air
travel.' Since the fifties, however, alcohol sales have be-
come a profit center for the airlines. This is evidenced by
the fact that over-all liquor prices increased 45% since
1977 (related to inflation) while in-flight drink prices rose
100%.2 Unfortunately for the airlines, several factors
combine to make the service of in-flight alcohol a some-
what risky proposition. The airlines' financial incentive to
continue alcohol service must be balanced with the pro-
motion of passenger safety, as well as the potential for the
imposition of server liability for the negligent acts of
drunk passengers. This is especially true because of the
potential for airline passengers to become inadvertently
drunk. The consumption of two to three drinks at alti-
tudes of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 feet has the
I Reukema, Drinking and Flying: Why The Two Do Not Mix Well On U.S. Carriers, 19
ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 133 (1984). "Complimentary alcoholic beverages
served in the first class cabin-even wine with meals in the economy class-were
all part of the gracious relaxed image of air travel." Id.
2 Flanagan, Personal Affairs: High and Mighty,. FORBES, Aug. 24, 1987, at 104;
Reukema, supra note 1, at 133. "[W]e have duty-free alcohol allowances on inter-
national flights, free drinks in the first class section, free drinks on charter flights
and, since the deregulation of the airlines in the United States ... we have free
drinks on any carrier trying to break into a new domestic market." Id. (footnote
omitted).
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physiological effect of four to five drinks.3 In light of this
fact, it is surprising that airlines have virtually escaped lia-
bility for injuries caused by intoxicated passengers. The
airlines have little incentive to discontinue or limit alcohol
service.4 Because of the economic reward, and the remote
possibility for imposition of server liability, airlines con-
tinue to serve virtually unlimited amounts of alcohol on
domestic flights.
The lack of cases imposing vendor liability on airlines
should not, however, be taken as an indication that the
service of alcohol on planes creates a situation where
there is less potential for alcohol related accidents and in-
cidents. For example, one newspaper reported that an in-
toxicated passenger's behavior became so disruptive that
the pilot made an unscheduled landing to remove the
drunken passenger.5 The danger to the safety of the
flight and the other passengers by such an event is obvi-
R. MCFARLAND, HUMAN FACTORS IN AIR TRANSPORTATION, OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY 298 (1953).
[A]lcohol exercises its primary physiological action by depressing
oxidation in the cells. This impairment is believed to occur not be-
cause alcohol interferes with the transport of oxygen to the tissues but
because "the tissue cells are poisoned in such a manner that they
cannot use the oxygen properly." . . . This interpretation explains
(1) the striking effects of alcohol on the nervous system and (2) why
alcohol and oxygen want produce more serious effects on the nervous
tissue and consequently on behavior if both are experienced
simultaneously.
Id.
, See Reukema, supra note 1, at 133.
An inebriated passenger causes problems not only for himself when
he feels ill, but also for his fellow travelers if he starts to make amo-
rous advances or, more commonly, decides to act belligerently. In
the latter case, the drunken passenger has transformed himself into
a safety hazard. The blame, however, for this metamorphosis should
perhaps be laid at the airlines' door.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
In January 1981, [a passenger] ... was aboard Laker Airways' flight
from London to Los Angeles en route to starting a job in
Califor[n]ia. He had been drinking heavily and when he was refused
any further alcoholic refreshment he became violent, screaming at
and kicking both the passengers and the pilot. His conduct was such
that not only was he tied to his seat by some of the other passengers,
but the pilot was also forced to make an unscheduled landing at
ous. It seems, however, that recognition and awareness
by the public of such incidents is limited. In sharp con-
trast, the recent national concern over drunk driving has
given momentum to the increased imposition of server li-
ability on more traditional alcoholic beverage servers.6
Litigation over server liability escalated an estimated
three hundred percent over the past two years.7 This
trend represents a change from the traditional common
law theory that a commercial vendor is not responsible for
the negligent acts of intoxicated patrons.
This comment focuses on the potential for imposing
vendor liability on airlines as a result of in-flight alcohol
service. An intoxicated passenger potentially endangers
the safety of other passengers, as well as innocent third
parties on the ground. The nature of the airline industry
presents some interesting and difficult legal questions
concerning liability for alcohol sales. For domestic
flights, a court must determine whether federal law, under
the Federal Aviation Act and FAA regulations, pre-empts
state dram shop law.8 If federal law pre-empts state law, a
court must decide if the injured plaintiff has a private
right of action based on FAA regulations.9 If federal law
does not pre-empt state law, there is the question of
which state law applies. Because planes often depart from
one state, fly across several states, and land in yet another
state, it is difficult to determine what law applies. This
comment analyzes these issues by looking at the potential
Winnepeg Airport in order that [the passenger] could be removed
from the aircraft.
Id. at 137 (citing the Montreal Gazette, January 6, 1981, at 8).
,; Goldberg, One For The Road: Liquor Liability Broadens, A.B.A.J.,June 1, 1987, at
84. "Groups like SADD and MADD have given momentum to the trend by in-
creasing public awareness of the consequences of drunk driving." Id.; see also
Comment, Liability of Commercial Vendors, Employers, and Social Hosts For Torts Of The
Intoxicated, 19 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1013 (1983).
7 Goldberg, supra note 6 , at 84. "In the last twenty months alone, appellate
level courts in nearly a dozen states have considered cases involving liquor liabil-
ity. Liability generally is based on serving alcohol to someone who is obviously
intoxicated or under the legal drinking age." Id.
See infra notes 13-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
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for airline liability based on the sale of alcohol to passen-
gers under the theories of: (1) a violation of the FAA reg-
ulations;' 0  (2) common law negligence;" and (3) a
violation of state dram shop legislation. 12
I. THE THRESHOLD ISSUE: DOES THE FAA REGULATORY
SCHEME PRE-EMPT STATE DRAM SHOP
REGULATION
The federal government regulates flights within the
boundaries of the United States under the statutory
scheme of the Federal Aviation Act. The Act authorizes
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations gov-
erning aircraft in order to promote safe air travel.' 3
These FAA regulations govern rates, routes, and services
of domestic airlines with interstate routes to the exclusion
of state regulation. "4 Before imposing vendor liability on
an airline, a court must determine whether the Federal
Aviation Act, through the FAA regulations, pre-empts
state dram shop laws as an impermissible regulation of
services of domestic airlines with interstate routes.' 5
In deciding whether FAA regulations pre-empt state
law, one central question is whether Congress intended,
within the existing statutory framework, to regulate the
See infra notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 93-131 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 132-144 and accompanying text.
49 U.S.C. app. § § 1348(a), 1421 (1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1982). "[N]o State . . . shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect
of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier having authority ... to
provide interstate air transportation." Id.
, , Manfredonia v. American Airlines, Inc., 68 A.D.2d 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286
(App. Div. 1979).
"It is well established that within Constitutional limits Congress may
preempt state authority by so stating in express terms. . . .Even
where Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation in a spe-
cific area, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually con-
flicts with federal law.
Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (cita-
tions omitted).
service and sale of alcohol on airlines to the exclusion of
the states. Congress can pre-empt state regulation in ex-
press terms, or through a pervasive regulatory scheme
which leaves nothing for the states to regulate.' 6 The Act,
through the FAA regulations, expressly pre-empts state
law governing the rates, routes, and services of domestic
airlines. It is debateable, however, whether Congress in-
tended to pre-empt state regulation concerning all as-
pects of air travel. The FAA regulation which could
arguably pre-empt the imposition of state dramshop laws
provides: "No person may drink any alcoholic beverage
aboard an aircraft unless the certificate holder operating
the aircraft has served that beverage to him .... No certifi-
cate holder may serve any alcoholic beverage to any per-
son aboard any of its aircraft who . .. appears to be
intoxicated." ' 7
The outcome of the pre-emption question has a signifi-
cant impact on the plaintiffs potential recovery for inju-
ries caused by an intoxicated passenger. If the FAA
regulations do not pre-empt state law, a person seeking
recovery for injuries could base their claim on either state
common law or state dram shop legislation. The result of
a determination that federal law pre-empts state law, how-
ever, is that any potential recovery based on vendor liabil-
ity must arise from an implied private right of action
under the FAA regulations. This entails a judicial deter-
mination that the plaintiff has standing under the federal
legislation. Of the few cases which discuss the potential
liability for service of alcohol on airlines, only one case
discusses the issue of federal pre-emption.
- Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 236 (1946) (United States
Warehouse Act held to pre-empt state regulation of warehouses licensed under
the Act although this was a field traditionally regulated by the states).
1' 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (a)-(b)(1) (1988).
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A. Federal Pre-emption in Manfredonia v. American
Airlines, Inc. 8
In Manfredonia, a passenger brought suit against the air-
line for injuries caused by an intoxicated passenger dur-
ing a flight from New York to Los Angeles.' 9 The plaintiff
testified that the intoxicated passenger, who was served
several drinks by the airline attendants, 20 made sexual ad-
vances toward her and struck her in the eye when she did
not respond.2' The plaintiff based her claim on two theo-
ries: (1) that the airline breached a common law duty of
care to protect her from the violence of an intoxicated
passenger, and (2) that the airline violated the "applica-
ble" laws which prohibit the sale of alcohol to an already
intoxicated person.2 2
In a requested bill of particulars, the plaintiff identified
the source of her second cause of action as the airline's
violation of FAA regulations.23 At trial, however, the
judge allowed the plaintiff to switch the source of her sec-
ond claim to a violation of the New York dram shop act. 4
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on
the charge of common law negligence in failing to exer-
cise proper care toward the plaintiff,25 and in favor of the
plaintiff on the claim that the defendant breached the New
York dram shop laws. 26
is 68 A.D.2d 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1979).
Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
21 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287. One of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that
the plaintiff complained to the attendants about the man's conduct. The witness
further testified, however, that the drunk passenger hit the plaintiff after she ut-
tered a racial slur. Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287 n.l.
-- Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
' Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
-'Manfiedonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287. Overruling the defend-
ant's objections, the trial judge submitted the case to the jury based on a theory of
violation of the New York dram shop laws. Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88.
2-1 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88. The plaintiff did not appeal this finding.
26 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
The jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiffs ensued after a charge by
the Trial Judge that a breach by defendant of the provisions of sec-
tion 11-101 of the General Obligations Law would render the de-
fendant liable for the damages caused by the assault on Linda, if the
The defendant appealed the trial court's finding of a
breach of the state dram shop law by arguing that New
York law could not be given extraterritorial effect.2 7 In
other words, the airline argued that New York could not
apply its dram shop statute to a situation where the con-
sumption of the alcohol and the injury occurred outside
the state boundaries of New York. 28 The court rephrased
the issue on appeal and inquired whether the dram shop
act applies to an airline in interstate flight either based on
extraterritorial jurisdiction or "in the face of Federal pre-
emption. ' 29 The court agreed with the defendant that the
New York statute could not be given extraterritorial effect
over service of alcohol on airplanes because federal law,
through the Federal Aviation Act, pre-empts state dram
shop law.3 0 The appellate court in Manfredonia did not,
however, leave the plaintiff without a remedy. The court
remanded the case and granted a new trial based on its
determination that the FAA regulations create a private
right of action against the airline from which the plaintiff
might be able to recover.3 .
jury found that the defendant had sold intoxicating beverages to the
offending passenger when the passenger was intoxicated and that his
intoxication had contributed to Linda's injury.
Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
27 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287. "The true inquiries must be whether New
York intended that its statute should operate beyond its limits, and then, whether
as a matter of Federal control, the statute can operate beyond the New York
boundaries, even assuming that the statute may have been intended to have that
effect." Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 289. The defendant also argued that "the
plaintiffs only interjected the statute as a ground for liability at the time the case
was about to go to the jury and therefore waived the provisions of the statute." Id.
at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
2" The extraterritorial application of state dram shop laws is beyond the scope
of this comment. For a discussion of this issue, see Annotation, Choice of Law-
Liability of Liquor Seller, 2 A.L.R. 4th 952 (1980).
2-1 Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
.- Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The court determined that the New York
statute did not have extraterritorial effect and that federal law pre-empts state law
on this issue.
Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 287, 292.
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B. Private Right of Action Based on FAA Regulations
The court in Manfredonia indicates that the FAA regula-
tions may create a private right of action for a passenger
injured in flight as a result of the airline's service of alco-
hol to another passenger. The Federal Aviation Act pro-
vides that "[n]othing contained in this chapter shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at com-
mon law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter
are in addition to such remedies. '3 2 In order to create a
remedy for the plaintiff in Manfredonia, the court inter-
preted this "savings clause" as preserving the state rem-
edy provided by New York's dram shop legislation
through an implied federal right of action based on FAA
regulations."
Under the established test in Cort v. Ash,34 an implied
right of action arises when: (1) the regulation is intended
to protect a particular class of persons; (2) there is an in-
tention to create or deny a private right; (3) the right
would be consistent with the goal of the statute; and (4)
the cause of action is one traditionally left to state law."
Applying this test, the Manfredonia court determined that
the FAA regulation creates such an implied right of action
because: (1) the plaintiff, as a passenger, is a member of
the class protected under the regulation; 36 (2) the statute
does not explicitly deny a private right of action; (3) a pri-
vate right of action furthers the goal of protecting the
safety of passengers by encouraging compliance with the
regulations; and (4) the "public policy of New York, ex-
emplified in the dram shop act, is entirely in accord with
49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1982).
Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91. But see Diefenthal v.
Civil Aviation Board, 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982) (no implied right of action for
injunctive relief under the structure of the federal aviation regulations to require
an air carrier to comply with its own rules on smoking).
:14 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
Id. at 78.
Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 291. "The statute, it is clear,
is instinct with a pervasive interest in safety of the passengers .... An intoxicated
passenger may pose a serious threat to the safety of all on the aircraft." Id. at 131,
416 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
the objectives of the Federal statute .... Interestingly,
the court seemingly glosses over the fourth factor in Cort
v. Ash which inquires whether "the cause of action [is] one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law."'3' The
regulation of the sale of alcohol is certainly an issue tradi-
tionally relegated to the states. Arguably, it is inappropri-
ate to imply a right of action under Federal law based on
state dram shop theories.3 9
C. Effect of the Holding in Manfredonia
The court's determination in Manfredonia that an in-
jured passenger has a private right of action under the
FAA regulations for injuries sustained from an intoxicated
passenger creates policy problems. For example, at least
two other foreseeable victims do not benefit from such a
private right of action because they are not members of
the class benefitted by the regulation. The creation of a
private right of action, along with the court's finding of
pre emption of state dram shop laws, remove the possibil-
ity of recovery for: (1) the intoxicated passenger for injury
due to his own intoxication, and (2) a third-party injured
on the ground by an intoxicated passenger. The presence
of these inconsistent remedies undercuts the goal of fed-
eral pre-emption to provide uniformity of remedies.4 °
In fact, five years after the decision in Manfredonia the
same court held in O'Leary v. American Airlines4' that a vio-
lation of the FAA regulation prohibiting the sale of alco-
hol to an intoxicated passenger did not create an implied
private right of action on behalf of the passenger for his
own injuries.4 2 The court determined that the purpose of
.7 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
- Cori, 422 U.S. at 78 (1975).
.- See infra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
4" Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
4, 100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1984).
• Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
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the FAA regulation is to ensure the safety of the flight and
the protection of passengers who might be injured by the
intoxicated passenger. 43 The court reasoned that a pas-
senger injured by his own intoxication is not one of the
intended beneficiaries of the statutory private right of ac-
tion. If the passenger's conduct does not impose risk to
the safety of the flight or to other passengers, the court
held that the regulation does not protect a passenger
from his own conduct." The court's dermination that the
regulation benefits one passenger's injuries over another
draws a seemingly fine distinction concerning the purpose
of regulation. If the underlying purpose of the regulation
is "to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft by minimiz-
ing the disorderliness caused by an intoxicated passen-
ger",45 it is equally plausible that the definition of
"disorderliness" includes a passenger's injury or death
due to his own intoxication.
The decisions in Manfredonia and O'Leary create a poten-
tially inconsistent framework for airline vendor liability.
First, it is debateable under the Cort v. Ash analysis
whether the FAA regulation prohibiting the sale of alco-
hol to an intoxicated passenger affords only some passen-
gers a private right of action against the airline. The lack
of a remedy for certain foreseeable victims is one of the
strongest reasons for finding that the FAA regulations do
not pre-empt state vendor liability laws. If the intent of
the regulation is to ensure the safe operation of the air-
craft, perhaps it was never a contemplated purpose of the
regulation to compensate any passenger for injuries re-
sulting from another passenger's intoxication. It is
equally as plausible that all passengers are the benefi-
ciaries of the regulation which ensures that pilots are not
4 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287. The court stated that "recognition of a pri-
vate right of action on behalf of the decedent for breach of the regulation is not
consistent with the statutory purpose." Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S. at 288. (citation
omitted).
.. Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88.
4 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 289 (dissenting opinion) (citing F.R. Doc. No. 59-
5580, filed July 2, 1959).
distracted from their duties of safely flying the aircraft by
drunk passengers. Second, if the airline has a recognized
duty to exercise care to keep its passengers safe from
known risks or dangers,46 a passenger injured by an intox-
icated passenger does not need a judicially created private
right of action under an FAA regulation in order to re-
cover. The basis for the plaintiffs recovery, therefore,
would be a breach of the common law duty of a common
carrier to ensure the safety of its passengers. 47 Third, an-
other problem with creating an implied right of action
under the Federal Aviation Act and related regulations is
that federal courts rarely find implied causes of action.4 8
Recent cases lead to the conclusion that if Congress does
not expressly create a right of action, then Congress prob-
ably does not recognize such a right of recovery. 49  Last,
it is unclear whether it is advisable to create federal com-
mon law that displaces state law. Answering this question
requires a balancing of federal and state interests. The
regulation of liability for negligent service of alcohol is
primarily a state interest. The creation of federal common
law by implying a private right of action under the FAA
regulations does not follow the recent trend in federal
cases.
50
46 See id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
,7 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
41 See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (statute did not create a
federal private right of action in a special class of beneficiaries but rather benefit-
ted the public as a whole); TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979) (Investment Advisors Act of 1949 is designed to protect invest-
ment advisors' clients but does not require the implication of a private cause of
action for damages). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 374-93 (1981) (a private party may maintain an action for damages
under the Commodity Exchange Act where Congress amended the Act and left
intact provisions under which prior courts implied a private cause of action).
4, See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297. "The federal judiciary will not engraft a rem-
edy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to pro-
vide." Id.
rw See Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) (when no rights or duties of
the United States are effected by the outcome of litigation between private parties,
the rule that federal common law governs in diversity cases where a uniform na-
tional rule is necessary to further the government's objectives is inapplicable).
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D. Pre-emption and the Twenty-First Amendment
In determining that federal aviation law pre-empts state
dram shop laws, the court's starting point in Manfredonia
was an analysis of a state's power to regulate the sale of
alcohol.5' Under the twenty-first amendment, states have
absolute power to regulate the "times, places, and circum-
stances under which liquor may be sold" within state bor-
ders.52 The court in Manfredonia noted, however, that the
twenty-first amendment does not empower the state to
regulate alcohol sales outside of the state, or in an area
under exclusive Federal control.
In order to define the scope of a state's regulatory
power under the twenty-first amendment, courts must de-
termine what areas constitute areas under exclusive fed-
eral control. In United States v. State Tax Commission, the
Supreme Court held that a states' regulatory power under
the twenty-first amendment did not include regulation
over importation of liquor onto a military base within the
state.54 The court reasoned that a military base is an area
over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction.55
The court in Manfredonia equated the United State's
sovereign jurisdiction over military bases with exclusive
federal jurisdiction over the operations of interstate trans-
., Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290; see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI,
§ 2. "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." Id.
.", New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715 (1981); see
also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-24, at 475-78 (2d ed. 1988).
"The amendment sanctions state action which taxes, regulates, or completely bars
the importation of liquor for actual use within the state itself, even where such
action would be forbidden as to any other commodity." Id. at 476-77 (citation
omitted).
:l Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing United States v.
State Tax Comm'n 412 U.S. 363, 375 (1973)); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329-34 (1964).
.,, United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363 (1973) (the state's legiti-
mate powers under the twenty-first amendment did not extend to permit the state
to tax and regulate wholesale liquor transactions between the United States, rep-
resented by the military base, and the out-of-state distillers).
5 5 Id. at 369-73.
portation.56 Under this analysis, the federal airways are
under the exclusive control of the federal government. No
state, therefore, could regulate the sale of alcohol on
board an aircraft traveling interstate. Based on this prem-
ise, the court concluded that federal law pre-empts state
dram shop law.57 There is a plausible argument, however,
that the particular FAA regulation prohibiting the sale of
alcohol to an intoxicated passenger does not pre-empt
state dramshop laws. Under this view, the twenty-first
amendment allows a court to find an airline liable for inju-
ries related to in-flight alcohol service based on state law.
1. Re-examination of the Limitation on State Regulation
Under the Twenty-First Amendment
In repealing the eighteenth amendment, the twenty-
first amendment changed the allocation of power over the
regulation of the sale of alcohol.58 The result was a pre-
sumption in favor of the authority of the states, not Con-
gress, to regulate liquor traffic as a matter of
constitutional law.59 As noted in Manfredonia,6 ° there are
limitations on this regulatory power.6' In particular, the
twenty-first amendment does not allow a state to regulate
the transportation of liquor into areas under the exclusive
Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citing 49 U.S.C. app.
subch. VI (1982)).
.77 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290. "Preemption [sic] by Congress of a field of
regulation implies an inherent need for nationwide uniformity and Federal pri-
macy ... [viarying State dram shop acts would perforce disturb the uniformity of
Federal regulations." Id. (citations omitted).
- L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-24, at 475 (2d ed. 1988).
51, New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (a state's
broad power under the twenty-first amendment includes the constitutional right
to prohibit nude dancing in establishments licensed to sell liquor in deference to
any artistic or communicative rights under the first amendment); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Ziffrin Inc. v. Reeves,
308 U.S. 132 (1939) (regulation by a state may impose some burden on interstate
commerce when such power is left to the states by the Constitution).
" See supra notes 53 - 59 and accompanying text.
L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 476. "For example, state power over alcoholic
beverages in transit through the regulating state is quite limited, since the twenty-
first amendment is limited by its very terms to importation of liquor into a state
for delivery and use therein." Id.
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jurisdiction of the federal government.62
The Supreme Court in United States v. State Tax Commis-
sion6 3 and Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. 64 held that
because national parks and military bases are places under
the exclusive sovereignty of the federal government, the
states cannot regulate the transportation of liquor into
parks and bases. The underlying rationale is that the
twenty-first amendment allows the states to regulate the
importation and transportation of alcohol for delivery and
use only within the borders of each state. If alcohol is de-
livered to an area under the exclusive sovereignty of the
United States, the twenty-first amendment does not apply
because there is no delivery or use within the borders of a
state.
Under the Federal Aviation Act, the term "federal air-
way" refers to that part of the navigable airspace as desig-
nated by the Secretary of Transportation.6 5 The Secretary
of Transportation is authorized to institute regulations
which are necessary to insure the safety of aircraft and the
efficient use of airspace.66 An airway has been defined as
a free highway in the sky.67 There exists on behalf of all
citizens of the United States a public right of transit
,;,z State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. at 375 (local state authorities could not under the
authority of the twenty-first amendment prevent military bases located in the state
from buying cheaper out-of-state liquor); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co.,
304 U.S. 518 (1938) (California could not require concessionaires within
Yosemite National Park to apply for permits for the importation and sale of liquor
because the National Park was a territory over which the state ceded exclusive
jurisdiction to the United States).
412 U.S. at 363.
304 U.S. at 518.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(21) (1982).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1348(a) (1982).
See Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12, 15 (1928).
The term "airway" applies to air routes for either airplanes or sea-
planes. An airway is far more than a mere air line. It is a material
and permanent way through the air, laid out with the precision and
care that an engineer adopts in choosing the course of and laying
down of a railway .... The term airway is essentially a free highway.
As such, it is open to all qualified aircraft. It is rightly, therefore, a
federal undertaking to lay out and equip airways.
125 Kan. at 100, 263 P. at 14-15.
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through this navigable airspace.68 In contrast, a private
citizen does not have such rights of transit into other ar-
eas under the exclusive sovereignty of the United States,
such as a military base.
Arguably the federal airways are under the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the federal government based on federal reg-
ulation of the airways. There are distinct differences,
however, between the federal airways and federal land
such as national parks and military bases. The most dra-
matic difference is that federal jurisdiction of parks and
military bases follows from direct ownership of such prop-
erty by the United States government. The United States
does not own the airlines that use the federal airways, but
merely regulates the industry as a whole to promote safe
air travel.
If airlines could be held liable under state law for inju-
ries sustained as a result of negligent sale of liquor based
on state dram shop laws, the state would not be attempt-:
ing to regulate the use of alcohol outside of the power
granted under the twenty-first amendment. This conclu-
sion is reinforced by the fact that a state has the power to
impose liability on those who cause torts within its bor-
ders.69 Under this analysis, the states' power to impose
dram shop liability on commercial airlines is based on
general state power to grant remedies for torts occurring
within its borders, and not upon the states power to con-
trol alcohol sale under the twenty-first amendment.70
49 U.S.C. app. § 1304 (1982).
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(numerous and substantial contacts constitute "doing business" in a state and are
sufficient minimum contacts to find personal jurisdiction); Keeton v. Hustler Mag-
azine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (circulation of a magazine in the forum state cre-
ates sufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction in a libel suit based on the
contents of the magazine).
7,) This scenario specifically refers to a fact situation where a third-party on the
ground is injured by an intoxicated passenger. For example, an intoxicated pas-
senger picks his car up at the airport and causes an accident on the drive home.
Ironically a state can avoid the "federal jurisdiction" limitation on the twenty-first
amendment with this argument. However, a passenger injured in-flight would
have to resort to the argument used in Manfredonia because the tortious conduct
occurred beyond the boundaries of any state.
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2. Re-examination of Pre-emption
In determining whether a federal law pre-empts state
law, the first inquiry is whether Congress occupies the
field to the exclusion of state action.7' If Congress does
not occupy a field to the exclusion of the states, the next
question is whether there is an irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the state and federal law, or whether state law frus-
trates the objectives of the federal law.72 Pre-emption
occurs to the extent that the state law actually conflicts
with federal law.73 If the field is traditionally one which is
within the domain of the states, there is an assumption
that the federal regulatory scheme does not pre-empt the
state law unless Congress clearly manifests such an
intent.74
There are many cases that consider whether the Federal
Aviation Act, through the FAA regulations, pre-empts
various types of state law. The determination of pre-emp-
tion is based on the subject matter sought to be regulated
by the states. One area clearly pre-empted by federal reg-
ulation is state and local control over aircraft noise.75 The
Supreme Court has determined that based on the perva-
sive federal scheme regulating aircraft noise, Congress in-
tended to occupy this field to the exclusion of state and
local regulation.7 6 Included in the pervasive regulatory
scheme of noise control are the Noise Control Act of
1972, FAA regulations and regulations of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency.77
71 Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (although
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 pre-empts the state regulation of the safety aspects
of a nuclear plant, a California statute prescribing adequate storage facilities for
nuclear waste is within traditional state responsibility of economic uses of energy
and is therefore outside the occupied field of federal law).
72 Id. at 204.
7I Id.
74 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (federal laws regulating
net-weight labeling pre-empt state statutes regarding such labeling); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (United States Warehouse Act pre-
empts state law in all aspects).
75 City of Burbank v. Lockheed, 411 U.S. 624 (1972).
7,; Id. at 633.
77 Id.
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Other areas of state regulation are not, however, con-
sidered pre-empted by the federal scheme of aviation reg-
ulation. For example, state laws governing reckless
operation of an aircraft are not pre-empted by the FAA
regulations. 78 The manner in which an airline advertises
its rates and routes is governed by state law and is not
pre-empted by the Federal Aviation Act.79 In addition,
federal legislation does not pre-empt state and local juris-
diction concerning the placement of private helistops8 0
From these cases, it is apparent that federal law pre-empts
state and local regulation of the operation and navigation
of aircraft but does not disturb significant local power
over ground operations.8 '
One confusing provison of the Federal Aviation Act ex-
pressly declares that the provisions of the Act will not
abridge remedies available under state law. 82  The
Supreme Court has held that a "common-law right, even
Is See People v. Valenti, 153 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 35, 200 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1984)
(California statute which provides punishment for flying an aircraft below pre-
scribed federal levels was not unconstitutional based on the Supremacy Clause);
Ward v. Maryland, 374 A.2d 1118 (Md. 1977) (state statute making it a crime to
recklessly operate an aircraft is not pre-empted by federal law which imposes civil
rather than criminal penalties for the same conduct).
79 People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237
(1984) (Congress granted the Board the right to regulate unfair competition and
deceptive trade practices but this did not mean that Congress intended to prevent
states from also regulating deceptive advertising practices).
,,, Garden State Farms, Inc. v. State of New Jersey, 77 N.J. 439, 390 A.2d 1177
(1978) (company seeking to maintain a helistop brought an action to invalidate a
statute prohibiting such use).
- Id. at 439, 390 A.2d at 1181. But see O'Carroll v. American Airlines, 863 F.2d
11 (5th Cir. 1989)(Federal Aviation Act pre-empts a state law claim based on
wrongful exclusion from a flight). The court held that the common law claim of
unlawful exclusion was pre-empted by 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1), which states:
"[N]o State... shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes or services of
any air carrier .. " O'Carroll, 863 F.2d at 13. The court, however, does not
distinguish the common law claim of unlawful exclusion from cases which have
held that state claims are not pre-empted by the Federal Aviation Act. See supra
notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
12 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part that
"[nlothing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in
addition to such remedies." Id.
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absent a saving clause, is not to be abrogated 'unless it [is]
found that the preexisting right is so repugnant to the
statute that the survival of such right would in effect de-
prive the subsequent statute of its efficacy. . . .' "83 States
enact dram shop acts pursuant to their authority to regu-
late the sale of alcohol within their borders under the
twenty-first amendment. 84 Dram shop acts provide reme-
dies for the negligent sale of alcohol. By its terms, the
Federal Aviation Act prohibits the pre-emption of state
dram shop laws because pre-empting state dram shop
laws would abridge remedies available under state law.
State dram shop laws neither conflict with nor frustrate
the FAA objectives of the regulation prohibiting the sale
of alcohol to an intoxicated passenger.85 State dram shop
statutes are intended to protect members of the commu-
nity from preventable harm. The purpose of the FAA reg-
ulation controlling alcohol service is to protect the safety
of flights from intoxicated passengers. 86 The federal poli-
cies are enhanced, not frustrated, by the application of
state dram shop laws.
II. AIRLINE VENDOR LIABILITY BASED ON STATE LAw
If the scheme of federal aviation law does not pre-empt
state actions for vendor liability and there are no remedies
available under the FAA regulations, in order to recover
against an airline a plaintiff must prove negligence based
on either a common law or statutory cause of action. Dur-
ing the post-Civil War period, state legislatures adopted
"dram shop" statutes.8 7 By the 1870's, at least eleven
1:1 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S 290, 298 (1976) (quoting in part Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907)).
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
"r, See, e.g., Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, 1120-
21, afS'd, 434 U.S. 814 (1977).
- Ellsworth v. Beechcraft, 37 Cal. 3d 540, 691 P.2d 630, 208 Cal. Rptr. 874
(1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. I 110 (1985) (heirs of deceased passenger brought suit
for wrongful death against estate of pilot and family owned flying business). "The
purpose of the regulations is to protect those who fly in airplanes or are affected
by their flight." Id. at 551, 691 P.2d at 636, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
"7 Comment, supra note 6, at 1015. "It is generally recognized that the stimulus
1989] COMMENTS 1031
states had some form of legislation imposing dram shop
liability.88 Currently thirty states have statutes establishing
liability for the illegal sale of liquor.8 9 At least fourteen of
these statutes give an injured person a statutory right to
recover directly from the server of alcohol.90 Part of the
rationale behind these statutes is to deter the sale of li-
quor to persons likely to injure themselves or a third
party.9' Policy reasons for imposing liability include the
fact that commercial vendors can insure themselves
against potential loss and are in the best position to con-
trol a patron's consumption of alcohol.9 2
A. Common Law Liability And The Duty Of A Common
Carrer
Under early common law, an injured person had no
cause of action against a commercial vendor of alcohol for
the acts of an intoxicated patron.93 The courts reasoned
that the proximate cause of an injury caused by an intoxi-
for early dram shop acts was the temperance movement rather than the more
recent concern with drunk driving." Id. at n.13.
es Goldberg, supra note 6, at 86.
811 Id. "Only in Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada and South Dakota are licensed alcoholic bever-
age dispensers: exempt from liability." Id.
i"' ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 4.21.02(1),(2) (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 30-1-02 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 5A-
109 (Supp. Harrison 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (Smith-Hurd 1986);
IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-15-10-15 (Supp. Burns 1988); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § II-
101 (McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-120 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-
01-06 (1986); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Anderson 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 3-14-1 to 3-14-15 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-14-1 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 7, § 501 (Supp. 1987).
m Comment, supra note 6 , at 1015.
112 Id.
The justifications for imposing this burden of strict liability on com-
mercial vendors are that they: (1) can purchase extensive liability in-
surance to bear the loss; (2) can spread the cost of insurance by
increasing prices; (3) have expertise in judging whether a person is a
minor or is intoxicated; and (4) can control the patron's
consumption.
Id.
, See, e.g., Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383, 386 (1967) (at com-
mon law a party injured by a drunk patron has no cause of action against a vendor
who continues to sell alcohol to the drunk patron).
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cated person was the voluntary consumption of the liquor
and not the vendor's act of serving the liquor.94 In recent
years, some courts have abrogated the harsh rule of nonli-
ability under two theories: (1) common law negligence, 9
and (2) negligence as evidenced by a violation of alcohol
beverage control statutes.96 The basis for this recent
trend of decisions is that the proximate cause of the injury
changes from the consumption to the service of the
liquor.97
The service of alcohol to someone becomes the proxi-
mate cause of an injury if serving the liquor is a "substan-
tial factor" in causing the injury.98 In other words, a seller
or server of alcohol is liable if the service of alcohol cre-
ates a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of injury. 99
Under this theory, liability can be imposed for: (1) selling
alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person;'0 0 (2) selling alco-
hol to a person known to become violent after drinking;'0o
4 Id. at 432, 226 A.2d at 386. "[T]he proximate cause of the intoxication was
not the furnishing of the liquor, but the consumption of it by the purchaser or
donee. The rule was based on the obvious fact that one could not become intoxi-
cated by reason of liquor furnished him if he did not drink it." Id.
11r Comment, supra note 6, at 1021. "Most jurisdictions following the Restate-
ment position recognize that a duty exists when an act creates a foreseeable, un-
reasonable risk of harm to third parties." Id.
,, Comment, supra note 6, at 1018. "[Liability is based] on the theory that alco-
holic beverage control statutes create a duty on the part of alcohol vendors to
third persons injured by intoxicated persons served in violation of the statute."
Id.
I7 See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1971) (injured driver brought suit against a tavern owner for injuries sustained
when an intoxicated patron's car struck the driver's car); Poole v. El Chico Corp.,
713 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (bar operator owes a duty to motoring pub-
lic not to knowingly sell alcoholic beverage to an already intoxicated patron). "If
such furnishing is a proximate cause, it is so because the consumption, resulting
intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are foreseeable intervening causes, or
at least the injury-producing conduct is one of the hazards which makes such fur-
nishing negligent." Vesely, 5 Cal.3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
1w Id. at 164, 486 P.2d at 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 302, 302A (1965).
m. Vesely, 5 Cal. 3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
Id. at 164, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631..
Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973) (plaintiff's
cause of action was sufficient to raise the issue of liability based on sale of alcohol
to an intoxicated person for harm to a third party).
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and, (3) selling alcohol with knowledge that the intoxi-
cated person will drive. 10 2 In many jurisdictions a server
of alcohol can be liable for the injuries caused by an intox-
icated person based on common law negligence. In the
past three years, courts in Oklahoma, Texas, and West
Virginia imposed liability on tavern owners for the first
time. 103
The elements of common law negligence are satisfied
when a vendor serves alcohol to an already intoxicated
person with knowledge that the person will drive. 0 4 A
duty arises because a reasonable person should have
known that serving liquor under those conditions would
cause injury to a third party. 05 The nature of the rela-
tionship between a common carrier and a passenger im-
poses a high degree of care and duty towards the
passenger. 0 6 Courts impose an even higher standard of
care on common carriers towards passengers under a
known disability.10 7 Intoxication is considered a disability
Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978) (a social host who serves liquor under circumstances which create a rea-
sonably foreseeable risk of harm to others can be held liable to injured third par-
ties). "We think it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously
intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to
drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk to those on the high-
way. . . . Simply put, one who serves alcoholic beverages under such circum-
stances fails to exercise reasonable care." Id. at 152-53, 577 P.2d at 674, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 539.
,, Goldberg, supra note 6, at 88.
,,,4 Comment, supra note 6, at 1021-22.
Id. at 1022.
"" See, e.g., Rathvon v. Columbia Pacific Airlines, 30 Wash. App. 193, 633 P.2d
122, 125 (1981) (sixteen wrongful death actions were filed against an airline after
the aircraft stalled and crashed approximately 2,000 feet from the end of the run-
way). A common carrier " [has] the duty to exercise the highest degree of care for
the safety of its passengers consistent with the practical operation of its busi-
ness.... This duty, however, falls short of making a common carrier an ihsurer of
its passengers' safety." Id. at 193, 633 P.2d at 129.
1,,7 See American Airlines Inc. v. Marchant, 249 F.2d 612, 613-14 (1st Cir. 1957).
Courts do not agree, however, on exactly what causes a breach of this higher stan-
dard of care owed to passengers with disabilities. In Marchant, a passenger recov-
ered damages from the airline for a ruptured eardrum. The passenger was not
aware of the ear disorder upon boarding, but notified a flight attendant as soon as
he felt discomfort. The court of appeals for the First Circuit found that the ear
discomfort qualified as a "disability". The attendant's knowledge of the disorder
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which requires this higher standard of care on the part of
the common carrier.10 8
There are few reported cases on the subject of a com-
mon carrier's liability resulting from the service of alcohol
in transit. The common law basis for holding a common
carrier (including trains and airlines) liable for the sale of
alcohol is examined in the following cases. In Cooper v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp., 109 a passenger brought
suit against the railroad for injuries sustained by falling
while intoxicated on the train."l0 The plaintiff alleged that
the train's employees continued to serve him liquor,
knowing of his intoxicated state, which was the proximate
cause of his injuries."' After acknowledging that the high
standard of duty owed to a passenger makes the carrier
liable for even the slightest negligence, the court none-
theless applied the early common law rule of nonliability
toward vendors of alcohol." 2 The court held that the
created a duty to use reasonable care to mitigate the damage to the eardrum.
According to the court, the attendants were trained in procedures that could have
prevented the ruptured eardrum. The court concluded that failure to aid the pas-
senger caused a breach in the duty owed to him. Id.
In 1983, however, a district court in New York issued a decision inconsistent
with Marchant in Sprayregen v. American Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 16, 17 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). In Sprayregen, the court held that there was no cause of action against the
airline for a passenger's permanent hearing loss caused by a ruptured eardrum.
The passenger, who boarded the plane with a head cold, claimed that the airline
owed a duty to passengers to warn of the dangers of flying with a head cold. The
court found that the airline did not have a duty to warn of dangers that affect only
a few passengers, such as a head cold. In dictum, however, the court commented
that the outcome of the decision may have been different if the airline's employees
were aware of the particular disability. Id. at 17-18. It is difficult from these two
cases to determine what level of duty is owed to a passenger experiencing a physi-
cal disorder. It is clear, however, that the airlines' notice of a physical disability is
an important factor in establishing a higher level of duty.
I'll See, e.g., Leval v. Dugoni, 444 So. 2d 778 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (a cab driver
who knew of a passengers intoxication was held to an even higher standard of care
in providing a safe place to exit than towards a sober passenger).
45 Cal. App. 3d 389, 119 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1975).
Id. at 392, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
Id. at 393, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
Id. at 394, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 545. "[E]ach of the foregoing expressions of law
reflects the basic view of society that self-police provides the primary defense
against the evils of intoxication and outside police plays only a secondary role."
Id. at 394, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
COMMENTS
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was the volun-
tary consumption of the alcohol, not the service of the li-
quor. Consequently, the railroad was not liable for the
plaintiff's injuries caused by serving him alcohol when he
was already intoxicated." l3 The result of the holding is
that the high standard of care owed to passengers did not
include care and foresight in the service and sale of alco-
hol in the bar car." 14
In Hanback v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad," 5 the court de-
nied a cause of action to an injured passenger against a
railroad for negligent sale of alcohol."t 6 In Hanback, an
intoxicated passenger assaulted and raped the plaintiff on
board the train." 17 The plaintiff sued the railroad for dam-
ages based on the theory that the train's employee negli-
gently continued to serve alcohol to the alleged rapist
when the bartender should have known he was already in-
toxicated." 8 Although the plaintiff recovered damages
based on a different theory of negligence, the court de-
nied recovery to the plaintiff based on a theory of vendor
liability. '19
The Hanback court recognized that a common carrier
owes a high duty of care to its passengers when the carrier
can anticipate foreseeable danger. 20  The carrier, how-
ever, has only limited control over the actions of other
passengers. Although it is impossible to watch over the
11.. Id. at 393, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544. "[Elven though the server is negligent and
in violation of law by continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to an obviously in-
toxicated drinker, the drinker's cause of action is barred by his own contributory
negligence . . . by his voluntary assumption of the known and conspicuous risks
incident to the consumptions of alcoholic beverages in bars." Id. at 393, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 544 (citation omitted).
11 Id. at 393, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
" 396 F. Supp. 80 (D.S.C. 1975).
Id. at 90.
117 Id. at 83.
- Id. at 81, 88.
-. Id. at 88. Although the plaintiff did not recover for the negligence of the
bartender, the court awarded damages for injuries resulting from the passenger
service employee who heard the screams for help and did not come to the passen-
ger's assistance. Id. at 90.
12.. Id. at 86-88.
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behavior of all passengers, the court held that the train's
employees had a duty to watch over those passengers that
an employee should reasonably anticipate would behave
improperly.' 2' There was no indication from the facts in
Hanback, however, that the accused rapist appeared drunk
in front of the bartender. The drinks were purchased for
a large group and taken back to the group. Consequently,
the drinks were not consumed in front of the bartender. 22
The court held that the bartender could not have known
who actually drank the liquor. 23 The railroad was not lia-
ble based on negligent sale of liquor to an intoxicated
passenger because the bartender was unaware that the al-
leged rapist was drunk at the time of the sale. Although
the court denied the plaintiff's right to recover under
these facts, it is significant that the court left open the pos-
sibility for finding a common carrier liable for damages
caused by the negligent sale of alcohol.1 24
In O'Leary v. American Airlines,' 25 the plaintiff brought an
action for personal injuries and wrongful death against
the airline claiming that the plaintiffs decedent died as a
result of injuries sustained in-flight. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant negligently allowed the decedent to
board the plane while intoxicated and continued to serve
him alcohol and food which proximately caused the dece-
dent to choke to death on a piece of food.' 26 The appel-
late court reversed the trial court's dismissal in favor of
the airline. 27 The appellate court found that the plain-
tiff's pleadings were sufficient to make out the existence of
12' Id. at 87.
12 Id. at 88.
121 Id.
121 Id. The court noted that there was insufficient proof to show that the assault
and rape were proximately caused by the other passenger's intoxication. Id.
125 100 A.D.2d 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Div. 1984).
12-" Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287. The plaintiff attempted to bring a cause of
action claiming that American Airlines violated 14 C.F.R. § 121.575, which pro-
vides in pertinent part: "No certificate holder may serve an alcoholic beverage to
any person aboard any of its aircraft who . . .appears to be intoxicated." Id. at
959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
127 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The appeals court agreed with the trial court
that the FAA regulation was not intended to "protect an individual passenger
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a duty on the part of the carrier and a breach thereof.'
The airline owed a common law duty to the decedent to
exercise reasonable care for known or reasonably antici-
pated risks because the decedent was under the disability
of intoxication. 129
A strong dissent argued that the defendant did not owe
the decedent any special duty to protect him from the
dangers of his own voluntary intoxication. 3 0 This analy-
sis refers to the early common law rationale that the con-
sumption, and not the service, of the liquor is the
proximate cause of any injuries. The dissent argued that
serving alcohol and food to an allegedly intoxicated pas-
senger does not breach any duty owed to the
passenger.' 3'
The O'Leary case is authority, however, for the proposi-
tion that an airline may be held to owe a common law duty
to an intoxicated passenger to refrain from the further
service of alcohol. A breach of this duty could create a
common law cause of action against the airline based on
negligent service of alcohol. It is conceivable under this
from choking to death as a result of his own intoxication." Id. at 959, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 288.
121 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 289. The "plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of
action for negligence, and she is entitled to an opportunity to present her proof at
trial." Id.
121, Id. at 959,475 N.Y.S.2d at 288. "[A] common carrier ... owe[s] a duty to...
[a passenger] to exercise reasonable care for his safety.... Moreover, if a passen-
ger suffers from a disability such as intoxication, there is a further duty on the part
of the common carrier to exercise ...additional care ..... Id. at 959, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 288. (citation omitted).
Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
The mere act of serving food and beverages to a person could not
reasonably be foreseen as causing that person to choke .... On the
contrary, serving food to an inebriated person, assuming, arguendo,
that the airline actually knew of decedent's state, is commonly per-
ceived as a means of attempting to ameliorate that condition. It is
questionable whether defendant could legitimately have refused to
serve food or drink to decedent, a first-class passenger who re-
quested this service.
Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
-1 Id. at 959, 475 N.Y.2d at 290. The dissent recognized that allowing these
sort of claims would "raise the spectre of indeterminate liability." Id. at 959, 475
N.Y.S.2d at 290.
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analysis that the airline's duty to refrain from serving alco-
hol to intoxicated passengers extends to foreseeable vic-
tims on the ground.
B. Liability Under State Dram Shop Legislation
In several states, legislation supercedes judicial imposi-
tion of liability. Currently, at least fourteen states have
modern versions of dram shop legislation which give a
statutory cause of action against the server of alcohol.'
Because of the difference in liability imposed by these
dram shop statutes, there is a potential for inconsistent
application of vendor liability on airlines. The court in
Manfredonia 33 noted that the variety of liability imposed
by state dram shop acts disturbs the uniform application
of federal regulations. 134 Because of this potentially un-
surmountable problem, the court created an implied pri-
vate right of action from the FAA regulations. Assuming
the court in Manfredonia incorrectly held that the FAA reg-
ulations pre-empt state dram shop law,'3 5 in order to de-
termine liability under state law a court must decide
under choice of law rules which state law applies.' 36 This
is not an easy task in light of the fact that it is difficult to
determine where the in-flight service of alcohol occurred.
It is possible for a plane to depart from one state, fly
across five states (during which time a passenger becomes
intoxicated), and land in yet another state. The intoxi-
1'- See supra note 90; see also Comment, The Continuing Search For Solutions To The
Drinking Driver Tragedy And The Problem Of Social Host Liability, 82 NW. U.L. REV.
403, 407 (1988).
II, 68 A.D.2d 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1979).
,.4 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
1:4r See supra notes 71-86 and accompanying text.
,:, See Smaha v. Hildebrand, No. 3-81-2038-6, slip op. (N.D. Tex. May 20,
1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The court stated that:
Before reaching this question of duty, however, it must first be de-
termined whether Texas's [sic] or New Mexico's choice-of-law rules
govern. In a diversity of citizenship action such as this, the federal
court must apply the substantive law of the forum state, including
the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which it sits.
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cated passenger might drive out of that state and cause an
accident in yet another state.
In addition, courts are split on the issue of whether the
civil damage statute of the place of sale or the place of
injury can be given extraterritorial effect. 37 For example,
a person could be injured in New York by a drunk driver
who bought and drank liquor in New Jersey, and later
drove into New York. A threshold issue for the court
would be whether New York's dram shop legislation ap-
plies to an injury which results from alcohol consumed in
New Jersey. The determination rests on whether the New
York legislature intended for the statute to have a broad
reaching regulatory effect.13 8
In Manfredonia, the court noted that the dram shop leg-
islation in some states has been given extraterritorial ef-
fect. 139 In all those cases, however, the sale of liquor
occurred in the state which enacted the statute and the
injury in another state. 4 ° In Manfredonia, both the con-
sumption of the alcohol and the injury occurred outside
the boundaries of New York.' 4' The only contact with
New York was that New York was the starting point of the
flight. The court determined that the policy of the statute
is not furthered by imposing liability for the sale of liquor
outside the state's borders. 42 The court noted that to
137 See Osborn v. Borchetta, 20 Conn. Supp. 163, 129 A.2d 238 (Super. Ct.
1956) (Connecticut court applied the New York Dram Shop Act reasoning that,
although the legislation lacked extraterritorial effect, it would be improper to
deny the rights articulated in the act because they did not violate or offend the
laws of Connecticut); cf. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. Saxner v. Waynick, 362 U.S. 903 (1959) (Michigan resi-
dents injured in a car accident in Michigan involving a car driven by an intoxicated
driver who bought the liquor in Illinois were denied recovery under the Illinois
dram shop act because the act lacked extraterritorial effect); see supra note 28.
rw Manfredonia, 68 A.D.2d at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
... Id. 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
14, Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 289-90.
141 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290. "As the beverages were served during the
flight, both the sale of the liquor and the injuries occurred beyond the limits of
New York." Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citation omitted).
14'1 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290. "[T~he public policy reflected by our statute
was to curb the evils and injuries arising from the sale of intoxicating beverages in
the State .. " Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (citation omitted).
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hold differently would create uneven protection for pas-
sengers boarding flights from New York and those board-
ing flights in states not having the benefit of dram shop
legislation. 43 The court concluded that such uneven pro-
tection would cause "chaotic and irreconcilable re-
sults. ' 14 4 In light of the varying liability imposed by
different state legislatures, this is a valid argument. It is
arguable, however, that the state in which a flight termi-
nates has a great interest in whether or not passengers
departing are intoxicated. This interest is potentially
strong enough to override the policy of applying the law
of the state where the alcohol was consumed.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the growing trend of imposing liability on
providers of alcohol, airlines should be held liable for in-
jury that results from the service of alcohol. As common
carriers, airlines owe the highest duty to passengers. The
issue becomes whether an airline also owes a duty to the
general public not to negligently serve alcohol. The
growth in general vendor liability for injury to third par-
ties is dramatic. It may not be long before such suits are
common against airlines. Potential liability could be
based on: (1) common law negligence; (2) state dram
shop legislation; and (3) FAA regulations. Airlines may
find themselves in the position of taking defensive meas-
ures, such as limiting the number of drinks allowed in-
flight, in order to protect themselves. Although such a
profitable airline service creates incentive to continue sell-
ing alcohol, the airlines need to balance the potential for
profit against the potential liability for injury to third par-
4. Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 290. The court stated in dictum that:
[T]o enforce the statute for the benefit of any passenger embarking
on a flight from New York to an out of state destination would cause
chaotic and irreconcilable results springing from the uneven protec-
tion afforded to passengers boarding the flight from states not hav-
ing the benefits of the dram shop act.
Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S. at 290.
11 Id. at 131, 416 N.Y.S. at 290.
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ties, as well as the potential dangers of transporting intox-
icated passengers.
The nature of air travel poses troublesome issues in
resolving vendor liability for in-flight alcohol service.
Each state regulates liquor within the boundaries of state
lines. In addition, state legislation which imposes server
liability varies widely. By relying on state law, a person's
remedy is dependent on what law the court the case is
filed in decides to apply. This potentially results in incon-
sistent application of liability caused by uneven statutory
protection.
It is unclear whether federal aviation law pre-empts
state law on the issue of vendor liability. To avoid the un-
even application of liability under state laws, perhaps the
FAA regulations need to be amended to reflect uniform
imposition of liability for negligent in-flight service of al-
cohol. Until there is a move toward uniform legislation,
airlines will increasingly be forced to settle suits out of
court for injury caused by negligent in-flight service of al-
cohol. It would be prudent for airlines to take more ag-
gressive measures to limit the service of in-flight alcohol.
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